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1 Executive Summary

Providers of electronic communication services are in the 
spotlight when it comes to Internet security. European 
citizens and enterprises have to trust them before they 
engage in commercial or social transactions online. 
However, spam and security incidents continue to hinder 
communications. Indeed, a lack of trust is having a severe 
impact on the information society in Europe. To improve this 
situation, the EU has provided a legal framework for 
electronic communication services and how to secure them. 
This report describes how providers have taken into account 
these legal requirements and what can be done to further 
secure European networks and services. It is based on 
surveys that ENISA conducted among providers as well as 
information gained from conferences and workshops. It 
focuses on recent developments and trends rather than on 
detailed statistical data. The facts, conclusions and 
proposals in this report are grouped under three main 
themes: 
Study - Overview 
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security 
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breaches implementation security 
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security or 
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Increasing transparency 
Reporting of security breaches – While reporting is to some 
extent mandatory in the US, reporting in the EU is mostly on 
a voluntary basis. Meaningful metrics and shared data on 
security incidents are necessary to increase the 
transparency of information security and to plan for 
appropriate and efficient countermeasures. 
Becoming aware of a security or spam problem – Many 
security problems go unnoticed. While the visible level of 
spam continues to be very high, the nature of the threat 
changes. More and more spam is unknowingly sent from 
citizens’ computers acting as so-called ‘zombies’. Brand 
names are hijacked and dubious registrars fool domain 
holders. Some providers see data on threats as proprietary 
information that gives them a competitive advantage. 
Furthermore, many still rely solely on complaints from 
customers rather than proactive network monitoring. They 
also fail to inform customers about the cost of 
countermeasures. Providers have to deepen their analysis 
of incidents, while Europe in general needs a warning 
mechanism to identify and address upcoming threats. 
Defining appropriate security 
State of the art and cost of implementation – Most providers 
follow so-called industry best practice. Many offer free 
spam filtering or hotlines, even at great cost to themselves. 
Reported data on damages from security incidents are rare, 
making a cost-benefit analysis difficult. Providers also have 
to improve customer confidence, for instance by showing 
compliance with security certificates. Further EU research 
is necessary. 
Email security versus privacy – Providers see a conflict 
between delivering secured services and protecting privacy. 
Opinion 118 of the Article 29 Working Party on privacy helps 
find the right balance between these conflicting goals. Still, 
the cost of widespread customised filtering is prohibitive 
and a further dialogue is necessary between privacy and 
security proponents. 
Setting standards 
Technical and Organisational Security Measures – The goal 
is not to find, but rather to refine security measures. 
Quarantining infected computers, securing the Domain 
Name Service and protecting neighbouring networks should 
be on the technical agenda. Providing clear contact details, 
offering detailed guidance to subscribers and raising 
awareness about identity theft helps secure 
communications from an organisational perspective. 
Consumer training could be provided in public-private 
partnerships. Measures depend on the type of business, the 
size and the maturity of the provider. 
Measures to fight spam – In the EU, various anti-spam laws 
are in place. The challenge is to enforce them, in Europe and 
beyond. The OECD Anti-Spam Toolkit, codes of conduct for 
providers, sender authentication techniques, fines for 
spammers and initiatives on collecting data on spam all play 
a role. Fear of counter-lawsuits from spammers, the 
prospect of additional income from dubious email 
marketing services and the burdensome reporting of spam 
cases continue to challenge some providers. Awareness 
about spam and related security threats must remain high. 
The following report is a deliverable of ENISA’s Work 
Program 2006. This research will be continued in 2007. 
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2 Introduction 
2.1 Motivation 
The European citizen does not yet feel secure when using 
the Internet, although much has already been done to make 
the Internet a safer place to communicate, to interact with 
governments and to do business. It is necessary to 
document security measures taken and communicate the 
results of these improvements to the European audience. 
In particular, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), 
telecommunication companies and other content and 
service providers play a major role in securing the Internet. 
They have implemented a wide range of security and anti-
spam measures, not only following their own risk 
assessment and cost/benefits analysis, but also in response 
to national legislation and written guidance on information 
security. Many of these have been put in place following 
European Directives, in particular the European Directive 
2002/58/EC (“Directive on privacy and electronic 
communications”) and the regulatory framework Directives 
for electronic communications (2002/19-22/EC). 
This deliverable from ENISA reports on the current status in 
Europe and provides an outlook on the future. It aims at 
increasing trust in electronic communications among 
businesses, governments and citizens of Europe, leading to 
a higher acceptance of eGovernment and eCommerce 
services. This is necessary to achieve the goals of the i2010 
initiative, creating an open and competitive single market for 
information society and media services within the European 
Union. 
2.2 Methodology 
This paper is the second part of deliverable 4.2.b of ENISA’s 
Work Program 2006, referred to as a “Study listing 
measures adopted and made available by providers of 
electronic communication services to comply with legal 
requirements regarding technical and organisational 
measures to safeguard the security of their services”, 
envisaged for the second quarter of 2006. The first part was 
delivered in February 2006, following a request from the 
European Commission (20051103_COM) to start working on 
this issue as early as possible and to deliver results before 
the deadline that was originally planned (2Q2006). This first 
study, conducted at the end of 2005/beginning of 2006, is 
subsequently referred to as the “ENISA Survey”. It has the 
reference number ENISA/TD/SP/06/0055. 
Consequently, ENISA adjusted the focus for this report. 
Complementing the first study with more data points and 
slightly adjusted questions, this report is based on data from 
the first study, from a number of workshops and 
conferences that ENISA has attended since its inception and 
on extensive Internet research. 
The report is organised around six major themes – topics 
that are most relevant, most neglected or most 
controversial. For each of the themes, it provides facts and 
observations, evaluations and conclusions, and advice and 
proposals. 
The facts and observations section is a summary of ENISA’s 
own studies and other data sources. Rather than listing all 
available data, this section focuses on recent trends and 
interesting data points. The information is given as-is, with 
short reference to the source. A detailed list of references, 
including web links, is included in the appendix. 
The evaluations and conclusions section describes the 
opinion of ENISA. Beyond the facts, they explain the 
reasoning behind why ENISA chose to list the data points 
above, and they prepare the basis for the third section. There 
is not always a direct link between the statements of the 
three sections; several statements have to be seen together. 
The advice and proposals section provides a draft for 
solutions. This can range from an early idea that needs 
further discussion with stakeholders and partners of ENISA 
to a strong proposal whose implementation ENISA will 
support with its weight in the European security community. 
This can pave the way to refined legislation, or at a minimum 
it will bring additional projects, workshops and deliverables 
from ENISA itself. 
Note that the recommendations in this report do not replace 
the recommendations in the February 2006 report. 
The report has been designed to bring concise and hopefully 
new information to the educated information security 
community. It is neither the definitive best practice guide on 
spam fighting, nor a general blueprint for future security 
legislation. It is merely a contribution to understanding the 
challenges that providers face, an outline of solutions that 
leading providers take – and that others may want to adopt 
– and an attempt to make the reader (re-)gain trust in 
electronic communications in Europe. 
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2.3 Overview 
The security of electronic communications services is a 
complex topic. There are technical, legal, organisational, 
political and business aspects. The issue of tackling spam is 
equally complex, but even more dynamic as threats and 
countermeasures evolve quickly. There is no one solution. 
Any paper on these topics has to address a variety of 
perspectives and opinions. 
This document describes the current status of security and 
spam in electronic communications services and predicts 
their potential development in the next two years. It does so 
by grouping dozens of data points, observations and 
proposals under three main themes. 
“Increasing transparency” has been identified by ENISA as 
the most crucial aspect. The information security 
community still needs to learn more about the current 
situation in European networks and the motivation of all 
players. It is especially relevant, because a number of 
projects are underway that could help increase 
transparency. Actual achievements are within reach. 
“Defining appropriate security” has been a goal at least 
since Directive 2002/58/EC came into existence. However, 
owing to cost and state of the art, it is often paid only lip 
service and, even when processes for defining security are 
drafted, they are rarely executed. It is difficult to see how 
major advances can be made in the short term, although 
some progress with regard to privacy vs. security is visible. 
“Setting standards” is a topic of ongoing discussion. Here 
the challenge is to stay informed about recent initiatives and 
developments both in the technical and political arena. 
Significant progress has been made in the past three years, 
but it is not yet time to shift the focus. Security measures 
and anti-spam measures require continuous attention. 
3 Increasing transparency

“If you cannot measure it, then you cannot manage it”, is 
common wisdom in corporate management. How can we 
manage information security if we still have so few data 
points and – more importantly – if these are not 
comparable? How can we decide on countermeasures if we 
do not have a clear – and timely – picture of what the 
problems are? Becoming aware of security risks is a 
necessary starting point; sharing this information with 
peers or reporting it officially is the complementary step. 
3.1 Reporting of security breaches 
Reporting of security breaches is a sensitive and heavily 
discussed topic. Not only is there disagreement as to 
whether and how reporting should take place, there is also 
no widely accepted definition of what a security breach is. A 
targeted port scan, a sniffed password, a web site 
defacement and a large-scale credit card fraud can all be 
considered breaches. It should also be noted that there is a 
difference between ‘a breach’ (a successful attack) and ‘a 
risk of a breach’ (a vulnerability) as mentioned by EU 
Directive 2002/58/EC. 
Shaping information security

and anti-spam measures in Europe

ENISA London AP NRAs 
EU Member States 
Providers 
OECD CNSA MAAWG ETNO 
Created EU Directive 
2002/58/EC 
Transposed it 
into national law 
Follow and 
implement in 
organisation 
and technology 
The general guideline for this report is European Directive 
2002/58/EC. It was used to structure the questionnaire 
which was the basis of the first survey. Moreover, some of 
the themes of this report link directly to the Directive, 
especially Article 4 and Article 13. However, the Directive is 
not directly applicable to providers of electronic 
communication services, who are the main group under 
discussion in this paper. The 25 Member States of the 
European Union transpose a Directive into national laws, 
and only these laws are binding for providers in the EU. In 
addition, there are a number of groups and initiatives in the 
information security community which provide additional 
guidance with regard to the Directive, the laws and their 
implementations by providers. 
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Reporting of security breaches 
•	 Make reporting of breaches prevalent and data 

comparable

•	 Keep vulnerability research motivated 
•	 Promote metrics 
•	 Provide information to customers 
•	 Incoming spam vs. outgoing spam 
•	 Promote information sharing 
Facts and Observations 
•	 Most providers decide by themselves if and how

subscribers and others should be informed. Around

half of providers inform customers about the risk of a

breach via private channels (i.e. private web site,

email or mail). Very few report to the public (e.g. by

publishing on the web site or in a press release). Only

in Finland are providers requested to report to the

Finnish National Regulatory Authority (NRA). (ENISA

Survey 2006)

•	 California’s State Bill 1386, which made reporting of

security breaches that involve Californian citizens

mandatory, went into effect on 1st July 2003.

Following this example, 30 other US states passed a

similar law. 20 of them come into force between 1st

January 2006 and 1st January 2007. As a result, a

number of high-profile breaches became public and

raised awareness of identity theft in the US.

•	 Vulnerability research becomes more and more

commercialised. A market develops, where security

researchers do not inform the public, but rather give

the information only to security companies which pay

them. (Symantec’s Internet Threat Report 3Q2006)

•	 The ‘Time to Compromise’ describes how long a

computer system without protection can be connected

to the Internet before it gets compromised. This is a

metric that illustrates the need for patches. The Time

to Compromise for a system varies, depending on the

ISP’s policy and the filtering rules of neighbouring

systems. (Symantec’s Internet Threat Report 3Q2006)

•	 Although most UK businesses have procedures in

place to log and respond to security incidents (83%),

only a small number maintain evidence to legal

standards (21%) or can deal with claims that an

outsider has taken control of the network (22%). (DTI

Report 2006)

•	 To promote the disclosure and sharing of cyber-

security information amongst firms, the US federal

government has encouraged the establishment of

many industry-based Information Sharing & Analysis

Centers (ISACs) under Presidential Decision Directive

63. (From “The Economic Consequences of Sharing 
Security Information”, 2005) 
Evaluations and Conclusions 
•	 It seems that the reporting of breaches increases 
transparency, encourages countermeasures and helps 
decrease the overall number of breaches. However, 
comparable quantitative data that would underpin this 
assumption are missing. 
•	 In most of Europe, reporting of breaches is not 
seen as mandatory and is not formalised. If there is no 
common approach for measuring and reporting, data 
cannot be shared. 
•	 Commercialised vulnerability research has two effects. 
On the one hand it is an incentive to spend time and other 
resources on research, thus helping the community to 
identify security problems. On the other hand, 
vulnerability information is no longer shared freely 
between researchers, so the risk posture will become 
more difficult to judge. It is important to have a co­
ordinated vulnerability publication process so that 
vendors have sufficient time to provide patches. 
•	 There are a number of measures that providers could 
take to help identify and communicate security breaches, 
for example they could install honey-pots and honey-nets 
to trace hackers’ activities or monitor unused IP address 
space. ISPs could also measure the Time to Compromise 
for selected vulnerabilities on a regular basis and share 
or report this information. This would allow providers to 
co-ordinate their policies, rewarding those providers who 
help increase the Time to Compromise and shun those 
who do not. It would also allow countries to some extent 
to describe their security posture, assuming that 
providers take their measurements within geographic 
borders. 
Advice and Proposals 
•	 Providers should start reporting to NRAs or to a trusted 
third party on a voluntary basis, using a set of agreed 
metrics. 
•	 Member States should encourage or require the 
reporting of security breaches. 
•	 The EU should introduce a range of guidance and/or 
legislation that provides incentives for the reporting of 
security breaches or even makes it mandatory. 
•	 ENISA should initiate a partnership for collecting 
information about trends and the volume of security 
breaches, including possibly ENISA itself acting as an 
Information Sharing and Analysis Centre. 
•	 A regulated market of vulnerability research is currently 
not an option. However, the EU must keep an eye on the 
development of commercialisation. A co-ordinated 
vulnerability publication process is important, balancing 
full disclosure (which puts pressure on vendors to issue 
patches) and controlled disclosure (which particularly 
allows critical infrastructure implementations to be 
secured before the vulnerability is made public). 
3.2 	 Becoming aware of a security 
or spam problem 
Before a provider can report on security breaches or 
massive spam problems, it has to become aware of them. 
Ideally, the provider would investigate the origin of the 
problem, the cause and the impact to its own 
infrastructure. The provider can monitor the network 
proactively or wait until someone reports the problem. 
Becoming aware of a security or spam problem 
•	 80% of all emails are spam 
•	 Most of today's spam is sent via zombies 
•	 EU countries receive more spam than they send 
•	 Zombie networks are getting smaller 
•	 Providers still rely too much on complaints 
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Facts and Observations 
• Almost two thirds of all emails that European providers 
receive are spam, while outgoing spam accounts for 
only about 5% of all emails (ENISA Survey 2006). 
However, some reports also indicate that more than 
20% of all spam worldwide originates from Europe (see 
section “Measures to fight spam”). 
• 80% of all email is spam, based on an evaluation of 
approx. 390 million mailboxes worldwide. (MAAWG 
Email Metrics Program 1Q2006) 
• 80% of spam is sent via zombies, according to a vendor 
report from 2004 (Sandvine). This figure is still widely 
accepted. (MAAWG Conference) 
• To a large extent, providers rely on complaints from 
subscribers to become aware of spam or security 
problems. In addition, providers cite complaints from 
other ISPs as a source of information. (ENISA Survey 
2006) 
• More than half of providers inform customers of 
remedies that they can take, but very few providers 
inform them about the associated costs. (ENISA Survey 
2006) 
• Providers observe more targeted malware. Hackers 
plan that such malware has only a short lifespan and 
they use only a few hundred zombies to stay under the 
radar of network monitoring. (MAAWG conference) 
• Some providers see information about fraudsters etc. 
as proprietary and competitive information and do not 
want to share it. 
• There are more than one hundred hijacked brands, 
several hundred unique password stealing malicious 
code applications, more than one thousand password 
stealing malicious code URLs and up to ten thousand 
new phishing sites every month. (APWG Phishing 
Activity Trends Report, February 2006) 
• Some dubious registrars also try to trick domain 
holders into changing their registrar and registering 
with them. This scheme is hardly any different from 
phishing. 
• There are ongoing discussions at ICANN to close public 
access to the WhoIs database in order to protect the 
privacy of domain owners. WhoIs databases are an 
important first step in identifying spammers. According 
to Spamhaus, even bogus entries in the WhoIs database 
help identify spammers. (MAAWG Conference) 
Evaluations and Conclusions 
•	 According to ENISA’s observations, the spam/email ratio 
in Europe is only slightly better than the measurement of 
the (US-dominated) Message Anti-Abuse Working Group 
(MAAWG). Figures have reached a high level and a 
mailbox without any spam-protection is practically 
useless. 
•	 While some reports indicate that spam coming from 
Europe has decreased, others show that it is on the rise. 
Both may be true. The legal situation makes it difficult for 
spammers to hide in the EU. However, technically their 
emails might still come from Europe – and increasingly 
they do. This must be attributed to an increased rate of 
bot-net infections, facilitated by an ever larger number of 
flat-rate always-on broadband connections in Europe. 
That is, while most spammers are located outside the EU, 
the infrastructure that they use – bot-nets of hijacked 
consumer PCs – is located in countries like France, Spain 
and Poland. 
•	 The spam problem is multi-dimensional. Dealing with 
spam requires a technical approach both on the sending 
side (i.e. with regard to bot-nets) as well as on the 
receiving side. Dealing with spammers requires an 
enforced legal framework that allows for legitimate direct 
marketing and removes incentives for spammers, i.e. sets 
fines that are a real counterbalance to the income from 
spam. 
•	 Increasingly security breaches and spam are not separate 
topics. A breach happens when an infected email 
attachment installs a Trojan on a computer, and spam is 
often sent from a bot-net which is the result of a number 
of security breaches. 
•	 Current and emerging risks such as domain kiting or 
domain registration scams evolve quickly (see section 
“State of the art and cost of implementation”). In order to 
find the appropriate political, regulatory or technical 
response, Europe needs fast and co-ordinated warning 
and information mechanisms. 
•	 Some providers rely only on complaints from subscribers. 
For a timely response, a more proactive approach is 
necessary, taking into account complaints from 
subscribers as well as continuously monitoring traffic. 
Indeed, most providers pursue such a combined 
approach. It is encouraging that providers also react to 
complaints from other providers. However, the ratio 
between partner complaints, subscriber complaints and 
problems identified by monitoring is not yet clear and 
requires further analysis. 
Advice and Proposals 
•	 With regard to problem identification, providers should 
rely first on their own monitoring capabilities, second on 
complaints from other providers and only then on 
complaints from subscribers. 
•	 The EU should support the positive identification of email 
senders (e.g. SIDF, DKIM). Providers should implement it 
as soon as possible and in a cost-efficient manner. 
•	 Providers should be encouraged (if not requested) to 
monitor their networks proactively rather then reacting 
only to complaints from customers. 
•	 ENISA should deepen the analysis of the ways that 
providers learn about security incidents and spam trends. 
•	 Europe needs to establish a warning mechanism to 
identify and address emerging threats. 
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4 Defining appropriate security

For a long time, a commonly accepted goal for information 
security was to bring it to the highest possible level. This is 
no longer the case. Overly high security measures will be 
circumvented with justification by business, while it still 
holds true that cutting budgets for desperately needed 
measures jeopardises security and puts business at risk. 
Moreover, security measures often conflict with the privacy 
rights of citizens. Striking the right balance and giving 
providers enough information to make an adequate decision 
is the main objective today. 
4.1	 State of the art and cost of 
implementation 
Information regarding what is possible, what is affordable 
and what is appropriate can come from a variety of sources. 
No source is perfect, hence it depends on how much one 
trusts the data, and the guidance that a particular entity 
compiled. Of course the authority and reach of that entity 
also plays a role. 
Facts and Observations 
• Most providers simply follow ‘industry best practice’. 
Around half of providers follow international standards. 
National legislation and advice from the national 
computer security organisation or from the NRA play a 
smaller role. (ENISA Survey 2006) 
• About half of providers perform an internal risk 
assessment, but few use a defined risk management 
process or a service level agreement. (ENISA Survey 
2006) 
• Many providers offer spam filtering free-of-charge. 
(ENISA Survey 2006) 
• Costs for running hotlines are already very high, and 
taking security-related calls is an additional burden for 
providers. (MAAWG Conference) 
• Several industry surveys have reported damage figures 
(e.g. FBI/CSI report in the US, DTI survey in the UK, 
AUS/CERT report in Australia, worldwide Deloitte 
survey), but these figures vary widely and are not 
comparable. (META Group Research Note #2982) 
• Security experts often argue the usefulness of 
statistical data on damages from security breaches. For 
example, in its 2006 report the Computer Security 
Institute (CSI) stated that the costs of security incidents 
are going down, while market analyst Gartner was quick 
to question such data. There is still no generally 
accepted measuring scheme. (CSI/Gartner) 
• Most people see a benefit in displaying a trust seal on a 
web site, according to a vendor report from 2006. 
(Goodmail Systems) 
• Many domain names are registered only for a few days 
at no cost (‘domain name kiting’), enabling click-fraud. 
On the other hand, domain name dispute resolution is 
very complex and costly, often involving the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (see www.wipo.int), 
ICANN (see www.icann.org), registrars and law firms. 
Hence, while many have to share the cost, only few gain 
benefits from this scam. 
• Forensic investigations of spam and security incidents 
are complex (e.g. maintaining the chain of custody) and 
often feasible only with expensive software. They also 
require a high level of expertise. (MAAWG conference) 
Evaluations and Conclusions 
•	 Although various reports on the cost of security measures 
(and the potential cost of not implementing them) have 
been published, there is still no common ground for 
measuring and hence no way to compare different data. 
•	 In a global economy, the state of the art of information 
security evolves internationally. National initiatives 
should focus on co-operation rather than on competition 
about the most appropriate measures. 
•	 A decision as to whether measures are cost effective and 
appropriate can only be made in a specific context. For 
example, most providers deemed it appropriate to 
sponsor spam filtering in an attempt to gain and maintain 
customer trust – and market share. 
•	 An investment in information security should yield some 
value, but in many cases providers fail to display and 
market this value appropriately. A trust seal or a 
certification helps communicate the trustworthiness of 
the service and justify the investments made. 
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•	 State of the art and cost appropriateness of information 
security are moving targets. Using a risk management 
methodology does not directly provide answers but helps 
lead the way towards solutions and makes the process 
repeatable. 
Advice and Proposals 
•	 Regarding Internet governance discussions, the 
European Commission should be aware of the conflict 
between easy domain name registration (helping market 
development) and thorough domain name registration 
(helping the fight against phishing and spamming). 
•	 The EU could encourage research and other projects that 
support the development and distribution of investigative 
tools. 
•	 The EU could help analyse some aspects of the security 
policies of European countries in order to improve overall 
efficiency throughout Europe. 
•	 ENISA should continue providing guidance on risk 
assessment and risk management methodologies (see 
“Implementation Principles and Inventories for Risk 
Management/Risk Assessment”, June 2006). 
•	 Member States should support and promote the use of 
risk assessment and risk management methodologies to 
help achieve a better understanding of the cost-benefit 
relationship of information security. 
4.2 Email security versus privacy 
A major principle of privacy is to keep personal data stored 
and transmitted securely. No-one should have access to 
personally addressed information except the recipient. But 
what if the recipient does not want to have access to all that 
information? As with Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle 
which states that the position and momentum of a particle 
cannot be determined at the same time as arbitrary 
precision, it is quite impossible to check private emails for 
security problems without infringing an individual’s right to 
privacy, at least to some extent. 
Email security versus privacy 
•	 Conflict exists between ISP obligations and privacy 
•	 Blocking PCs is often deemed illegal 
•	 Article 29 WP opinion mostly allows filtering 
•	 Providers would like more information on spam laws 
Facts and Observations 
• Nearly two thirds of providers replied that they think 
there is a conflict between the ISPs’ obligations to 
deliver messages/protection of privacy and the use of 
spam filters that block certain messages. (ENISA 
Survey 2006) 
• The fight against bot-net causes problems for providers, 
because blocking legal and paid-for connections from 
consumers who are unaware of their infected PCs may 
violate privacy laws and is often deemed illegal. 
• The Article 29 Working Party discussed the balance 
between privacy and security in Opinion 2/2006 
(WP118). In short, filtering of email is allowed under 
certain conditions in the more obvious cases (i.e. 
protection from viruses and spam), but in other evolving 
scenarios (e.g. customisation services) further analysis 
is necessary. (Art.29 WP opinion) 
• Allowing subscribers to opt out of filtering is technically 
challenging. If filtering is implemented in the backbone 
at IP level, the provider either allows all email from the 
filtered network (including spam) or the subscriber 
cannot receive any email from that network. Specific 
filtering (i.e. allowing incoming email from a defined 
address) is only feasible if the user is allowed to see all 
emails, making it very costly for the provider who has to 
transfer all emails (including spam) and provide a 
mechanism for receiving/rejecting specific emails. 
(MAAWG conference) 
• Most providers would like a workshop to provide 
information about the laws and legal problems 
regarding spam. (ENISA Survey 2006) 
8Provider Security Measures Part 2 June 2006 
Evaluations and Conclusions 
•	 Fighting spam is linked to filtering, but providers have 
obligations to deliver emails. If they want to help 
customers there is a constant risk of being in conflict with 
the law. 
•	 Some providers unofficially told ENISA that they did not 
want to reply to our questionnaire because questions 
were embarrassing. They also said that they do filter 
emails, but they do not want their customers to know it. 
•	 There will always be a conflict between ‘protection of the 
individual’ (privacy) and ‘protection from the individual’ 
(security), but there is a range of options to balance the 
two sides. Before the Article 29 Working Party opinion, the 
range of legal options was not clear, leading to 
uncertainties among providers. 
•	 It is not the task of providers to solve legal conflicts; they 
need clear guidance regarding what is and is not allowed. 
The Opinion 2/2006, published in February 2006, clarifies 
legal aspects of filtering significantly. It seems that the 
Article 29 Working Party document on email screening is 
not yet well known. 
Advice and Proposals 
•	 Providers should take into account the Opinion 2/2006 
document regarding email screening. 
•	 ENISA should promote Opinion 2/2006 views and could 
organise a workshop on the laws and legal aspects 
regarding spam. 
•	 ENISA should encourage Member States to raise 
awareness among citizens about blocked PCs, to the 
effect that a failure to connect to the Internet can be 
caused by a malware infection on the citizen’s PC. 
•	 The EU should promote the Opinion 2/2006 document 
regarding email screening and continue to clarify where 
filtering of content is allowed, building on this opinion 
from the Article 29 Working Party. 
•	 The EU (namely the Article 29 WP) and providers should 
enter a dialogue to find a reasonable balance between the 
cost and the effectiveness of specific filtering for opt-out. 
5	 Setting standards 
Often it is too difficult – or costly – to determine which 
measures are appropriate. Instead, providers are looking at 
what others are doing, hoping that the average solution will 
be both cost efficient and appropriate, from an information 
security perspective. If something goes wrong, courts and 
the public will at least attest a best-effort attempt. 
5.1	 Technical and Organisational 
Security Measures 
Providers have to secure their services but, for the most 
part, it is up to them to decide the details. Technical security 
measures can apply to the end-user’s device or the network 
infrastructure hosted at the provider’s premises. 
Organisational measures can have an effect on all parties 
involved and range from unidirectional information to multi­
lateral co-operation. 
Technical and organisational security measures 
•	 Most providers use a combination of techniques 
•	 Focus is on protecting own network 
•	 DNSSEC is deployed in Sweden 
•	 Providers quarantine infected computers 
•	 Users act more carelessly at work 
Facts and Observations 
• Most providers use a combination of 3-5 different 
protection techniques. (ENISA Survey 2006) 
• Egress filtering (protecting other networks) is much 
less used than ingress filtering (protecting own 
network). Most providers offer contact details for email 
abuse; around 15% of them do not. (ENISA Survey 2006) 
• DNSSEC is deployed in Sweden, the Russian TLD .RU is 
signed, and tests have been made by Mexico and the 
Netherlands. (see www.dnssec.net/news and 
www.ripe.net/disi/) 
• Two thirds of providers quarantine infected computers. 
(ENISA Survey 2006) 
• Around half of providers have a Business Contingency 
process or a Disaster Recovery process (often mandated 
by corporate governance requirements). However, 
providers admit that these processes are rarely tested. 
(ENISA Survey 2006) 
• Only half of providers make an effort to inform 
subscribers regularly and in detail, e.g. with written 
guidance or with regular information via web site, email 
or physical mail. (ENISA Survey 2006) 
• In the United States, 48% of workers who admit they are 
more likely to open suspicious emails or Web links on 
their work computers than at home said it was because 
they had IT to support them if something bad happened. 
Germany (39%) and Japan (28%) featured similar 
results. (Trend Micro study, 2005) 
• Many fraudsters are not concerned about revealing 
their identity, because they often live in countries 
where they do not expect punishment. 
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Evaluations and Conclusions 
•	 Countermeasures depend on the type of business, the 
size and the maturity of the provider. They also depend on 
the type of client on which the provider focuses its 
activities. Enterprise clients (who often desire some 
autonomy in their operations) have different 
requirements from consumers (who often look for the 
cheapest service). The differentiation between enterprise 
and consumer clients can be problematic for small 
enterprises, who often act like consumers (lack of 
security expertise) but at the same time require business 
level performance (24x7 connectivity). 
•	 Since many providers depend on customer complaints to 
become aware of security problems, it follows that most 
providers offer contact details. 
•	 Providers still do not take training and awareness-raising 
serious enough and rarely offer courses. One might argue 
that it is not the role of an infrastructure provider to do so, 
even though they are in a good position for such activity, 
given that they have existing relationships with large 
numbers of Internet users. They would also benefit from 
having educated users, mitigating the risk of malicious 
activity from those users. 
•	 Alternatively, the government could be in charge. 
Examples in some countries have proved that 
eCommerce benefits when users learn how to use new 
technology (e.g. introduction of the eID card in Belgium). 
•	 The implementation of DNSSEC in a country is a complex 
process, and overall DNSSEC penetration is low. 
Advice and Proposals 
•	 ENISA – in co-operation with the community of providers, 
should establish a platform for information exchange 
about measures to secure electronic communications. 
•	 The EU and ENISA should promote specific measures 
such as quarantining of computers (in compliance with 
privacy legislation), the availability of contact details for 
security issues and email abuse, filtering and DNSSEC. 
•	 Consumers need better information and training on 
specific security issues. This could best be provided and 
would have the broadest reach with public-private 
partnerships between government entities and providers. 
5.2 Measures to fight spam 
Originally, spam was considered a mere nuisance and not a 
security issue. However, a changing landscape of threats 
(sometimes called ‘threatscape’) makes one question this 
assumption, as phishing attacks, spyware and botnets (also 
called crimeware) spread via email and are often 
indistinguishable from ordinary spam. Spamming in 
telephony (SPIT) and instant messaging (SPIM) also add 
complexity to the threatscape. 
Measures to fight spam 
•	 Many countermeasures are of a legal nature 
•	 Anti-spam laws are in place in the EU 
•	 Providers are worried about law suits from spammers 
•	 Providers reject direct SMTP 
•	 Statistical information varies 
•	 OECD anti-spam toolkit published 
•	 Several codes of conduct for providers exist 
Facts and Observations 
• Most measures that providers take to prevent 
subscribers from sending spam are of legal nature 
such as ‘forbid spamming in Terms and Conditions’ and 
‘inform subscribers about the legal consequences of 
spamming’. The technique most often used to limit 
spam in received email is blacklisting. (ENISA Survey 
2006) 
• Almost all EU countries have anti-spam laws. However, 
on a worldwide basis, only 23% of countries have anti-
spam legislation enacted; 64% of the countries do not 
have such laws. (ITU Survey on Anti-Spam legislation 
worldwide) 
• Sometimes providers are afraid of law suits from 
spammers when blocking them. In some developing 
countries, (anti-spam) law enforcement is seen as 
difficult, because such countries do not have sufficient 
investigative powers. (MAAWG conference) 
• In nine countries in Europe, fines were imposed on 
spammers ranging from around one thousand Euros up 
to tens of thousands of Euros (with two exceptions of 
very low fines). (CNSA) 
• Some providers admit that some of their customers are 
spammers. (ENISA Survey 2006) 
• Spam statistics from filtering vendors vary widely and 
change quickly. Often there are only a few EU Member 
States on the list of sending countries (e.g. 
www.Spamhaus.org , 21.6.2006, only the UK in position 
#8, accounting for 3% of spam) and more on the list of 
spam receiving countries (e.g. four EU countries suffer 
from 21% of the world’s spam, according to TrendMicro, 
June 2006). In all cases, the US is at the top of the list. 
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• 25% of providers reject direct SMTP connections. The 
number is increasing as more and more providers 
decide to ’manage’ port 25. Very many providers offer 
spam filtering free-of-charge on their network, some 
offer it for a fee, around 20% do not offer any filtering 
(either with or without a fee). Canadian providers have 
also successfully used this method to limit spam. 
• In 2006, the OECD published the OECD Anti-Spam 
toolkit. It recommends measures in the areas of 
regulation, enforcement, industry-driven initiative, 
technologies, education and awareness, co-operative 
partnership, spam measurement and global co­
operation. (OECD Anti-Spam toolkit) 
• The joint BIAC-MAAWG (as part of the OECD toolkit), 
Australia, Finland and Italy (as well as others) have 
developed codes of conduct for providers to fight spam. 
• While there have been initiatives on Whitelisting for 
direct email marketing (e.g. the Certified Sender 
Alliances, initiated by eco in Germany), most email 
marketers deal with it on a case-by-case basis. 
• Sender authentication techniques like SIDF and DKIM 
associate an IP address or a message with a domain 
name. Although these mechanisms are flawed 
(spammers use these techniques as well to 
authenticate their emails), they are part of the solution, 
and can be complemented with reputation schemes. 
Sender authentication has already achieved some 
deployment; in particular large numbers of email 
senders can be covered by publishing authentication 
records for high profile domains such as eBay, Yahoo, 
Hotmail, Gmail, PayPal. When such companies request 
their users to disregard all emails from their domain 
that are not signed, this will increase pressure on other 
companies to also implement sender authentication. 
(MAAWG conference) 
• The EU initiated the Contact Network of Spam 
Authorities (CNSA), bringing together DPAs and NRAs, 
depending on the country. The CNSA shares information 
on emerging problems, reporting of spam and 
prosecution of spam cases. 21 countries have signed up 
so far. The CNSA is similar to the London Action Plan 
(LAP), the worldwide initiative led by the UK/US. CNSA 
and LAP operate closely together. 
• There are several initiatives for collecting data on 
spam. ‘Spotspam’ is an initiative by the German 
eCommerce association, ‘eco’, in combination with the 
Polish NASK, funded by the EU. ‘Signal Spam’ is a 
similar project in France, supported by several French 
ministries. A Memorandum of Understanding between 
the two initiatives has been signed recently. Digital 
Phishnet is an initiative in the United States. 
• In some countries, reporting of spam is burdensome, 
e.g. different authorities are responsible for different 
types of spam or complaints are only possible via 
ordinary mail. On the other hand, in the Netherlands 
reporting of spam has been made easy with an online 
form and consequently the authorities receive a large 
number of reports. (CNSA) 
• Consumers’ reporting of spam is a problem. Even if 
reporting is made easy, deleting spam is always easier. 
A decrease in reported spam does not mean less spam. 
(CNSA) 
Evaluations and Conclusions 
•	 Europe suffers more than average from spam and is less 
often the origin of spam. However, it might not stay this 
way. Spammers increasingly use bot-nets for sending 
spam from European countries. These are installed on 
consumer PCs with always-on broadband connections. 
•	 The situation of spam is similar to the situation of 
firewalls in the early days. Then, the first approach of 
firewalls was to block all malicious traffic, similar to 
blacklisting of spammers. This works, as long as the type 
and volume of malicious traffic is understood and 
controllable. Later, the strategy for firewalls changed 
from default-allow to default-deny, which is similar to 
whitelist filtering and the authentication of email. 
•	 Detailed technical and organisational guidance on 
fighting spam is available. 
•	 From a legal perspective, spam originating in Europe is 
not the problem; it is the lack of anti-spam laws and their 
enforcement outside of Europe. Within Europe, the legal 
conflict between confidentiality of communications 
(privacy) and filtering of communication (security) is more 
relevant. 
•	 It should be noted that spam is not simply a problem for 
ISPs. Rather it is a whole ecosystem consisting of big and 
small connectivity providers, hosters for applications and 
platforms, DNS, email and other service providers. 
Technical and legal changes affect the system as a whole. 
Advice and Proposals 
•	 Providers should focus on driving interoperability and 
standardisation, in particular of sender authentication 
mechanisms. 
•	 Providers should manage SMTP connections via port 25. 
•	 Member States should help educate end-users about 
spam problems and solutions. This could be done at 
Member State level, linked to the i2010 initiative and 
eAdministration. 
•	 Awareness campaigns by Member States should also 
stress that reporting of spam does have an impact on the 
fight against spam. 
•	 ENISA should promote the use of ‘Spotspam’ and related 
projects. 
•	 Given the number of best practice guides available, ENISA 
will only summarise best practice and otherwise refer to 
existing guides. 
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6 Appendix 
6.1 Terms and definitions 
Blacklist 
Content Filtering 
DKIM 
DNSSEC 
Electronic 
communications 
network 
Electronic 
communications 
service 
Measures 
Opt-in 
Opt-out 
Providers 
Quarantining a 
computer 
Sender ID 
A blacklist is an access control mechanism that means allow everybody, except members of the 
blacklist. Source: Wikipedia 
Content filtering is the most commonly used group of methods to filter for security problems (e.g. 
viruses). Content filters act either on the content, the information contained in the mail body, or 
on the mail headers (like ‘Subject:’) to either classify, accept or reject a mail. Source: 
Wikipedia/ENISA 
Domain Keys Identified Mail (DKIM) provides a method for validating an identity that is associated 
with a message, during the time it is transferred over the Internet. That identity then can be held 
accountable for the message. Source: http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ 
DNSSEC (short for DNS Security Extensions) adds security to the Domain Name System (DNS) 
used on Internet Protocol networks. It is a set of extensions to DNS which provide origin 
authentication of DNS data, data integrity and authenticated denial of existence (i.e. authenticated 
non-existence reply). DNSSEC was designed to protect the Internet from certain attacks such as 
DNS cache poisoning. All answers in DNSSEC are digitally signed. By checking the signature, a 
DNS resolver is able to check if the information is identical (correct and complete) to the 
information on the authoritative DNS server. Source: Wikipedia, based on RFC 4033-4035 
Electronic communications network means transmission systems and, where applicable, 
switching or routing equipment and other resources which permit the conveyance of signals by 
wire, by radio, by optical or by other electromagnetic means, including satellite networks, fixed 
(circuit- and packet-switched, including Internet) and mobile terrestrial networks, electricity cable 
systems, to the extent that they are used for the purpose of transmitting signals, networks used 
for radio and television broadcasting and cable television networks, irrespective of the type of 
information conveyed. Source: EU Directive 2002/21/EC 
Electronic communications service means a service normally provided for remuneration which 
consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks, 
including telecommunications services and transmission services in networks used for 
broadcasting, but excludes services providing, or exercising editorial control over, content 
transmitted using electronic communications networks and services; it does not include 
information society services, as defined in Article 1 of Directive 98/34/EC, which do not consist 
wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks. Source: EU 
Directive 2002/21/EC 
Information security measures to limit the impact of spam and other malware and to secure 
electronic communications services. Source: ENISA’s own definition 
Allowing unsolicited communication for purposes of direct marketing only with the consent of the 
subscriber. Source: ENISA’s own definition 
Allowing unsolicited communication for purposes of direct marketing unless the subscriber 
expressed the wish to not receive these communications. Source: ENISA’s own definition 
Providers of electronic communications networks and services such as ISPs (Internet Service 
Providers), telecommunication companies, hosting and similar service providers. Source: ENISA’s 
own definition 
Quarantining a computer means isolating a computer into a special network until it has reached 
a certain security level. Updates for anti-virus signature files or software patches are made 
available for installation. Source: ENISA’s own definition 
Sender ID validates the origin of email by verifying the IP address of the sender against the 
purported owner of the sending domain. Source: Microsoft 
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SIDF
Sender Policy 
Framework (SPF)
Whitelist
Zombies
The Sender ID Framework (SIDF) is an email authentication technology protocol combining the
Sender Policy Framework (SPF) and the Microsoft Sender ID for email into a single standard.
Source: Microsoft
Sender Policy Framework (SPF) is an extension to Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), the
standard Internet protocol for transmitting email. Source: Wikipedia
A whitelist is an access control mechanism which means allow nobody, except members of the
whitelist. Source: Wikipedia
A zombie is a computer attached to the Internet that has been compromised by a security hacker, a
computer virus, or a Trojan horse. Generally, a compromised machine is only one of many in a ‘bot-
net’, and will be used to perform malicious tasks of one sort or another under remote direction. Most
owners of zombie computers are unaware that their system is being used in this way. Because the
vector tends to be unconscious, these computers are metaphorically compared with a zombie.
Source: Wikipedia
ENISA Survey 2006 – Survey on Industry Measures taken
to comply with National Measures implementing Provisions
of the Regulatory Framework for Electronic
Communications relating to the Security of Services
(ENISA/TD/SP/06/0055, February 2006) –
www.enisa.eu.int/doc/pdf/deliverables/enisa_security_spa
m.pdf
OECD Anti-Spam Toolkit – published by the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Task
Force on Spam – (April 2006) – www.oecd-antispam.org/
Article 29 Working Party – Opinion 2/2006 (WP118) –
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/
2006/wp118_en.pdf
Contact Network of Spam Authorities (CNSA) –
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?referen
ce=IP/05/146&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiL
anguage=en
ITU Survey on Anti-Spam legislation worldwide –
www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/legislation/
Background_Paper_ITU_Bueti_Survey.pdf
MAAWG conference – www.maawg.org
MAAWG Metrics –
www.maawg.org/about/FINAL_1Q2006_Metrics_Report.pdf
APWG Phishing Activity Trends Report (February 2006) –
www.antiphishing.org/reports/apwg_report_feb_06.pdf
DTI Report on Security Breaches –
www.pwc.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/7FA80D2
B30A116D7802570B9005C3D16
Computer Security Institute and FBI report on Computer
Crime and Security Survey – www.gocsi.com/
Gartner comment on CSI report –
www.gartner.com/DisplayDocument?doc_cd=141622
META Group Research Note #2982 –
www.metagroup.com/us/displayArticle.do?oid=48913
Symantec’s Internet Threat Report 3Q2006 –
www.symantec.com/enterprise/threatreport/index.jsp
Trend Micro study – End-User Revelations About Risky
Online Behavior at Work, published in 2005 –
www.trendmicro.com/en/about/news/pr/archive/2005/pr09
1305.htm
Sandvine – Spam/Trojan Trend Analysis (2004) –
www.theregister.co.uk/2004/06/04/trojan_spam_study/
The Economic Consequences of Sharing Security
Information – Esther Gal-Or & Anindya Ghose, 2005.
Industrial Organisation 0503004, EconWPA –
http://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpio/0503004.html - 2005
Goodmail Systems – 
www.goodmailsystems.com/certifiedmail/
6.2 List of references
6.3 Additional links 
Best Practice 
•	 Good Practice for combating Unsolicited Bulk Email – 
www.ripe.net/docs/spam.html 
•	 MAAWG and APWG Anti-Phishing Best Practice – 
www.maawg.org/about/publishedDocuments/Anti_Phishing_Best_Practice.pdf 
•	 BIAC and MAAWG Best Practices for ISP – 
www.oecd-antispam.org/article.php3?id_article=232 
Statistics 
•	 MAAWG stats – www.maawg.org/about/FINAL_1Q2006_Metrics_Report.pdf 
•	 Spamhaus – www.spamhaus.org/statistics/countries.lasso 
•	 Trend Micro – www.trendmicro.com/spam-map/default.asp 
•	 Sophos – www.sophos.com/pressoffice/news/articles/2006/07/dirtydozjul06.html 
Others 
•	 ITU Cybersecurity Gateway – www.itu.int/cybersecurity/ 
•	 Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) – www.antiphishing.org/ 
•	 Digital PhishNet – www.digitalphishnet.org 
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